The unexplained occurrence of inefficient delays in reaching agreement is known in the economics literature as the "Hicks paradox." This paper describes a strategic situation in which players may play a simultaneous move game either before or after a move of Nature. The structure is such that if the players were expected utility maximizers, they would be indifferent over the order of play. However, if at least one of the players is a nonexpected utility maximizer, for example, if player one has preferences over lotteries which exhibit betweenness and fanning out, such a player may strictly prefer to wait before playing the game. If both players exhibit fanning out and betweenness, then there exist games in which both prefer to delay agreement. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 020, 026. 6
1. INTRODUCTION It is common in the analysis of economic environments to consider the effects of making contingent plans. Typically, the ability to formulate a contingent strategy before a particular state of Nature is realized enhances an agent's choice set and, if it does not strictly improve welfare, usually does not reduce it. We analyze a game situation in which two agents may interact strategically either before or after a random move of Nature. Since the strategy choices may be contingent on the state, players do not, by moving earlier, lose any ability to exploit the information that knowledge of the state may impart. The standard analysis, in the context of expected utility maximizing agents, suggests that offering the players the opportunity to decide earlier has no welfare effects. Alternatively stated, if agents can make contingent plans in an expected utility framework, the act of waiting to observe the state of Nature provides no value to the players.
The objective of this paper is to demonstrate that such a result is highly dependent on the assumption of expected utility agents or, more specifically, preferences which satisfy the independence axiom. The independence axiom implies strong restrictions on the form of preferences over lotteries, restrictions which in effect imply the irrelevance of the order of moves described above. Since a change in the order of moves induces a change in the character of the lotteries which face an agent, a more general class of preferences may suggest that such a change will not be innocuous (for a recent survey, see Machina, 1987) .' In particular, if preferences under uncertainty are such that a player strictly prefers to wait until Nature moves before he makes his move, even if players are impatient, that is, even in the presence of economic reasons which encourage an earlier rather than a later agreement, we might witness an incentive for a player to delay coming to an agreement.
The paper describes a strategic situation in which players may play a simultaneous move game either before or after a move of Nature. The structure is such that if the players were expected utility maximizers, they would be indifferent over the order of play. However, if at least one of the players is a nonexpected utility maximizer, for example, if player one has preferences over lotteries which exhibit Allais paradox type of behavior (Allais, 1953) , such a player may strictly prefer to wait before playing the game. It is known that the Allais paradox violates the independence axiom and therefore affects evaluation over compound lotteries. Our formulation contains a component game with a Nash equilibrium in mixed strat-I Other papers that examine the integration of game theory and nonexpected utility include Crawford (1990) , Fishbum and Rosenthal (1986) , Safra (1986, 1989) , and Dekel et al. (1990). egies -different compound lotteries are created by different strategy choices. The general form of the Allais paradox known as the common consequence effect has the feature that if the possibility of a bad common outcome can be eliminated, a nonexpected utility maximizer will become less willing to bear risk. By waiting until after Nature moves, before playing the component game, player one puts himself into a position of lower risk tolerance. In equilibrium, then, player two is forced to offer a more attractive equilibrium mixing. Our main result indicates that, for the strategic situation we examine, if one of the players has preferences over lotteries which exhibit fanning out and the betweenness property then that player can force a delay to agreement. We further show that there exist games in which both players may benefit from waiting until Nature moves before agreeing.
The result has implications for both nonexpected utility theory and for economic game theory. In one-person decision problems with nonexpetted utility, the problem of time consistency often suggests that decision-makers have a strict preference to be able to commit themselves earlier rather than later.* This example shows that in a strategic setting, such a preference may be reversed. In economic games, specifically dynamic games, it is of interest to determine when players may agree to participate in a trade. In labor economics the reason for occurrence of strikes and delays in reaching agreements is still unclear. This problem is often referred to in the literature as the Hicks paradox (Hicks, 1953 ) (see also Kennan, 1986; Hart, 1989) . The general question of why we witness delays in bargaining is a characteristic problem. While our framework is different from a standard dynamic bargaining game, the result may shed some light on the issue of timing of agreements.3
THESTFUTEGICENVIRONMENT
Consider the strategic situations in Figs. la and lb. In Fig. la , Nature moves left (with probability pi) or right after which two players participate in a simultaneous move game. The payoffs depend on the move of nature: if nature moves left, they play game G, ; otherwise they play GZ. It is assumed that both Gi and G2 possess a unique Nash equilibrium. Figure  lb describes an alternative situation in which players may meet before * For more on the time consistency problem of a nonexpected utility, see Kami and Safra (1988) , Machina (1989), and Segal(1988) . Aumann and Maschler (1972) discuss the minimax solution to a two-person zero sum game and point out the potential dynamic inconsistency that can arise in such environments.
3 For a related analysis in the area of cooperative game theory, see Perles and Maschler (1982) . Nature moves and play, instead, a simultaneous game in contingent strategies. A strategy choice of a player commits him to a play in each state of Nature.
The two structures can be integrated by the following extensive form game. In period one, players decide independently whether to meet before Nature moves and to play the simultaneous game G or to postpone play until after the state is realized. If both agree to meet, G is played and players are committed to their strategy choices-Nature moves and payoffs are realized according to these strategies. If either or both decide not to meet, then Nature moves and players are forced to play either Gt or GZ. We refer to this outcome as delay to agreement. Note that this structure provides a sort of veto power to each agent over early agreement. Thus, if there is an agent who strictly prefers to wait, this preference will ensure that agreement occurs later rather than earlier. This asymetry can be rationalized by the spirit of participation constraints. No one agent can be forced to play at either stage of the game and the presence of both agents is necessary for the game to be played. This structure is adopted for simplicity. It serves to emphasize the potential consequences of situations where at least one agent benefits from a delayed agreement.
THE CASE OF EXPECTED UTILITY MAXIMIZER
First consider the case in which the preferences of both individuals satisfy the independence axiom, that is, if X, Y, and 2 are lotteries, X is preferred (weakly) to Y if and only if (X, p; 2, 1 -p) is preferred (weakly) to (Y, p; Z, 1 -p) for all lotteries Z. The independence axiom is equivalent to preferences over lotteries which can be represented by a functional which is linear in the probabilities (see, for example, Marschak, 1950; Samuelson, 1952; Lute and Raiffa, 1957; Kreps, 1988) .
It is well known that if players are expected utility maximizers, the outcome of the strategic environment in Section 2 does not depend on whether players agree,early or late. To see this, fix the Nash equilibrium strategies of player two, (Tag, u22 in game G1 and in G2, respectively. The strategy choices of player two determine a set of lotteries for player one in each game. For simplicity, suppose that the equilibrium in Gi is in pure strategies yielding the certain payoffs (ui, ~2). In game GZ, the strategy choice of player two, u22, induces a set of lotteries for player one. Given these lotteries, let j E J index the pure strategy choices of player one and let {Aj(a&} be the set of corresponding lotteries which player one is choosing from when he chooses his strategy. By definition, Aj'(u22) 21 Aj (u22) ( 1) for all j' in the set of best responses. Observe that the result that the equilibria in the component games remain equilibria in the game in contingent strategies simply comes from the fact that the independence axiom along with (1) implies that
Equation (2) illustrates that any pure strategy which is a best response in G2 remains a best response as a contingent strategy in G. Thus, in either Fig. la or lb, with expected utility, the unique Nash equilibrium of each subgame determines the ex ante distribution of outcomes. If the players do meet earlier rather than later the unique equilibrium in contingent strategies simply reproduces the Nash equilibrium strategies of each component game. Players are indifferent between being able to contract (i.e., play the contingent strategies) earlier and being forced to wait until after the move of Nature. And, if there are economic reasons for coming to an agreement earlier, players will strictly prefer to do so. For example, suppose that players' payoffs are discounted from the time of agreement. In such a situation, both players, if they are expected utility maximizers, will strictly prefer the opportunity to play the contingent strategy game.4
SOME REMARKS ON NONLINEAR UTILITIES
The expected utility framework assumes linearity in the probabilities, that is, the utility from a lottery (x, p) can be represented by a functional V(x, p) = C piU(Xi). However, the Allais paradox as well as other experi-SAFRA, AND VINCENT mental evidence suggests that agents making decisions under uncertainty exhibit a systematic violation of this linearity.6 Since the independence axiom is necessary for the characterization of preferences by a linear functional, these deviations are often viewed as violations of the independence axiom.
The linearity in probabilities can be represented graphically by considering the set of all possible lotteries on the fixed payoffs xl < x2 < x3.
Observe that every such lottery can be described by a pair (pr, p3) (with p2 = 1 -pI -~3). The set of all such lotteries is just the unit simplex in Fig. 2 . Since the prizes of these lotteries are fixed the individual preferences are a map of upward sloping indifference curves; an increase of p, must be offset by an increase of p3. A northwestern movement in this triangle represents a move toward stochastically dominating lotteries. It is generally assumed that such a move is always preferred by any decisionmaker-whether or not he is an expected utility maximizer. When an individual maximizes expected utility, his preferences in the (pr, pi) plane are linear with slope [U(x2) -U(xI)]I[U(x3) -U(XZ)]. Note that expected utility implies not just linear indifference curves but parallel curves as seen in Fig. 2a .
A deviation from the expected utility framework implies that the indifference curves may no longer be either parallel or straight lines. The 6 The Allais paradox can be constructed by asking agents to reveal preferences over two pairs of choices of lotteries: a,: $3 million for sure versus a2: $5 million with probability 0.1, $3 million with probability 0.89, and 0 with probability 0.01; and al: $5 million with probability 0.1 and 0 with probability 0.9 versus ~4: $3 million with probability 0.11 and 0 with probability 0.89. Experimental evidence suggests that the modal choice is for a, over a, and a3 over a4 which violates the independence axiom (see Machina, 1987 ).
Allais paradox itself can be explained simply by relaxing the assumption of parallel indifference curves and allowing them to "fan out" as in Fig.  2b , that is, higher level indifference curves are also steeper.7 Note that in general preferences may not be linear but still can exhibit fanning out.
NONEXPECTED UTILITY PLAYERS AND THE INCENTIVES FORDELAY
In the strategic environment of Section 2, if equilibria are in pure strategies, then whether or not agents are expected utility maximizers will have no effect on the outcome of the game. However, as Eqs. (1) and (2) make clear, if equilibria are in mixed strategies and agents are nonexpected utility maximizers, then outcomes might well be different depending on when agents agree to play since agents face different compound lotteries at different stages of the game. Furthermore, at least one agent may strictly prefer the outcome associated with a delayed agreement. Our aim is to characterize a general class of preferences over lotteries which in our specific game would lead an agent to strictly prefer to wait until the second stage to play the game.
Modeling nonexpected utility agents is a delicate problem. If we are willing to accept any relaxation of assumptions about preferences then almost any type of behavior can be explained-the problem (and the model) becomes empty. On the other hand, one would like, as always, to specify preferences as generally as possible. The above analysis suggests a relatively minor deviation from the expected utility hypotheses which still allow for phenomena of the nature of the Allais paradox as well as a wide range of preferences over the space of lotteries. Specifically, we assume that both players have a preference relation in the space of lotteries (or probability distributions) that are represented by continuous functions Vi (i = 1, 2), which are also monotone with respect to the order induced by first-order stochastic dominance. Let player two be an expected utility maximizer, which implies that V, is linear "in the probabilities" (this assumption is not necessary and is later relaxed).
Player one has preferences which violate the independence axiom. We assume that VI satisfies the betweenness property (Chew, 1981; Dekel, 1986; Fishbum, 1983) by fanning out refer to Fig. 2 . Letting X, = 0, x2 = 3, x3 = 5, the four lotteries a,, az, a3, a4 are represented in the simplices. The fact that a line joining at and az is parallel to that joining a3 with a4 along with the expected utility restriction of parallel and linear indifference curves requires that if a, is preferred to a2 (as is the case shown here) then a4 must be preferred to a,. The second simplex shows that the same implication does not necessarily follow when preferences exhibit fanning out (see Machina, 1987) . yields the outcome of A with the probabilities of A, multiplied by A, and the outcomes of B with B's probabilities, multiplied by (1 -A). This implies that in the triangle representation (described in Section 3) player one's indifference curves are straight lines (not necessarily parallel to each other). The betweenness property clearly implies that player one will choose to mix exactly when he is indifferent between his pure strategies (assuming, as stated above, that he uses the usual reduction method to evaluate mixed strategies (see Dekel et al., 1990) ). Finally, we assume that player one's indifference curves "fan out." It is here that we depart explicitly from the framework of expected utility and it is this feature which we exploit to illustrate the incentives for delay.
Observe that the betweenness property does imply a restriction on preferences-one might consider, instead, preferences which are quasiconcave or quasi-convex in the probabilities. The quasi-linear form was chosen mainly because it represented the weakest deviation from the expected utility axioms. Furthermore, restricting indifference curves to be linear enables us to avoid other issues unrelated to the issue at hand. If preferences are strictly quasi-convex, the issue of existence of Nash equilibrium arises.* On the other hand, if preferences are NOT quasiconvex. Green (1987) shows that even if an agents initial wealth is nonstochastic, the agent can always be induced to "make book against himself." Green uses this result to argue against the plausibility of non-quasi-convex preferences. The betweenness property simplifies our analysis; it is not necessary for the delayed agreement.9
Let us now reconsider the problem presented in Section 2. Fix Gi to be the trivial game Gi = (0,O)'O and G2 to be the bimatrix game in Fig. 3 Thus, if Nature chooses left, then both players get 0. If right, then they play the game G2. For expositional reasons, we have chosen to present the result using specific numerical payoffs. Exactly the same conclusions result if we let the payoffs in game G1 be (x1, y) and replace the payoffs in game G2 by setting xl for 0, x2 for 3, x3 for 5 for player one (with xl < x2 < x3) and z in place for 3 for player two. If the players decide on their strategies before Nature moves, then they face the 2 x 2 matrix as in Fig. 4 . If player one plays up and player two plays left, then player one faces the lottery that gives him 0 with probability p1 and 5 with probability p2. Player two gets 0 with probability one.
It is clear that in both games G and G2, there is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. It is also clear that in both games if player one plays a mixed strategy (y, 1 -y) in which the weight y of playing up is larger than b, then player two will choose to play right. Similarly, if y < 4, then player two will play left. Hence, equilibrium requires that player one play (4, a).ll Consider now the equilibrium mixed strategies of player two. Here, we exploit the nonexpected utility behavior of player one. Consider the game G2. If player two plays the mixed strategy (6, 1 -6) (6 for left, 1 -6 for right), then player one has the choice between the lotteries A,(6) = (5, 8; 0, 1 -a), if he plays up, and A*(6) = (0,6; 3, 1 -6), if he plays bottom. Let (Y be the equilibrium mixing of the second player such that a mixing of (Y makes the first player indifferent between Al(a) and A2(a). That is, A,(a) = (0, 1 -a; 5, a) -I (0, a; 3, 1 -a) = A2(a).
(3)
When 6 < cz we have VI(A2(S)) > Vl(A2(cr)) = V,(A,(a)) > VI(A1(6)) (inequalities follow from the monotonicity of V,), hence bottom is chosen. If 6 > (Y then, similarly, V,(A,@)) > V,(A#)), and hence top is chosen.
" Observe that the argument for -y = $ holds whether or not player two is an expected utility maximizer.
FERSHTMAN, SAFRA, AND VINCENT
This implies that the unique equilibrium in G2 has player one play the mixed strategy y = 4 and player two play the mixed strategy 6 = (Y. With these strategies, the game yields player one the lottery 
Now consider the game, G. If player two plays the mixed strategy (6, 1 -6), then player one faces the lottery B,(6) if he plays up or B2(8) if he plays down. Let /3 be the equilibrium mixing of player two such that BI(P) = (0, 1 -P + PIP; 5, P2P) -1 (0, P + (1 -loPI; 3, PZU -P)) = B2U9.
As before, G has a unique Nash equilibrium in which player one plays y = t and player two plays 6 = p. Given these strategies, player one is faced with the lottery, (B,(P), 4; B2WL 9, which reduces to Db = 6-k &h/2 + (1 -,@/2 + p/2 + (1 -p)p,/2; 3, (1 -,@p2/2, 5, pp2/2) = (0, (1 + p1Y2;
3, (1 -P)p2/2; 5, Ppzl2).
The question now arises about the relationship between (Y and /3. It is clear that if player one is also an expected utility maximizer, then (Y = p.12 CLAIM 1.
When the preferences of player one exhibit fanning out, p < a.
Proof.
Suppose not, i.e., CY 5 /3. Compare the indifference curves of player one through B2(j9 and A*(a), respectively. Since (Y I 0, (1) and (3) imply that VI(A2(a)) > VI(B2(P)). The slope of the indifference curve through A*(a) is a/(1 -24 while the slope of the curve through B*(P) is I2 One can easily prove this claim by showing that (Y = p is derived by equating the slopes of the indifference curves. Simplifying yields a contradiction--a > p. H PROPOSITION 1. Zf the indifference curves of player one exhibit betweenness and fanning out, then player one imposes a delay to agreement.
Proof.
Comparing the lotteries D, and &, (4) and (6) n Remark 1. Since the inequality is strict, it is clear that even when player one is impatient-that is, even if his utility is defined both on the equilibrium lotteries and on the date in which the strategies are decided upon-then as long as his impatience is sufficiently small, the above result continues to hold and he prefers to wait until the second period.
Remark 2. The strategy of the proof can be used to show two related results: if player one's indifference curves "fan in," rather than "fan out," he strictly prefers to agree earlier; if the payoffs in game Gr are (53) instead of (O,O), then player one again strictly prefers to agree earlier.
Observe that in both G and G2, the first player plays the mixed strategy (0.5, 0.5). Thus there is no issue of time consistency on his part even
though he is the nonexpected utility maximizer. It is the second player (the expected utility maximizer) who changes his equilibrium strategy between G and GZ. The change of strategy occurs however because some of the uncertainty is resolved and there is now a different mixing that makes the first player indifferent between playing up and down. In particular, once the game G2 is played the uncertainty regarding the state of Nature is resolved and the possibility of getting (0,O) is eliminated. Our assumptions regarding player one's preferences implies that the possibility of being at G affects his evaluation of lotteries associated with the game G2. Thus the mixing that makes him indifferent between up and down is no longer the same. Once the uncertainty concerning game Gi is resolved, player one (in accordance with the Allais paradox) becomes more reluctant to bear the risk embodied in game G2. Player two is thus obliged to offer a more favorable gamble in the equilibrium of that game.
SOME GENERAL RESULTS
The reasoning underlying the example in Section 5 can be used to show that in more general games and with more general preferences there are still incentives to delay agreement. Proposition 2 illustrates this point. Proposition 3 shows further that, for some games, both players may prefer to delay coming to an agreement until the resolution of the state of Nature. In what follows, game G2 is generalized to the class of games in Fig. 6 with a > d > 0, and c 2 b > 0. PROWSITION 2. Assume that both +i are quasi-concave and that ?=I satisfies betweenness and fanning out (strictly). Let (y, a) be a Nash equilibrium (NE) of G2. Then player one strictly prefers delaying the agreement and playing (y, a) to any possible Nash equilibrium of G.13 I3 G, may have more than one Nash equilibrium.
However, in all of them, 0 < (Y < 0.5 is fixed and player one derives the same utility level. The same holds for G.
Proof. The NE (y, a) presents player one with the lottery A = yA,(a) + (1 -y)A2(a) (in G2) and with the corresponding ex ante lottery, D(a;y) = [O,PI +pMl -y) + ~(1 -a));d,pA1 -a)(1 -ri; a,wyl.
By fanning out, in G, the best response of player one to any Q' 2 cx is y = 1. Hence, in all NE of G, player two plays a strategy p, 0 < p < (Y. That the resulting NE lotteries are worse than D(cw; y) for player one can be shown by differentiatingp2cuy with respect to CY, holding (a( 1 -y) + ~(1 -a)) fixed. Using the fact that y > (Y (since y > 0.5 and (Y < 0.5 by stochastic dominance), this implies that p2ay decreases as (Y decreases. Thus, if p < (Y, there exists a 6 for which the lottery D(@; 6) = 10, pi + p2(p( 1 -6) + 6(1 -p)); d, p2(1 -p)(l -6); a& p2/381 is stochastically dominated by D(a; y). A lottery such as D(p; 6) can be found which lies on the line joining [B2(/3), B&3)], where these are the lotteries facing player one in the game G. Betweenness now implies that all points on this line are strictly worse than the lottery D(a; y). n Remark 3. A similar proof can be used to show that if the preferences of player two exhibit fanning out and betweenness and if the NE in GZ, (y, (Y), satisfies CY > (1 -y), then player two prefers delay. This result can now be used to yield Proposition 3. It is important to note that once we compare the games before and after the revelation of the state of Nature we do so by analyzing the way the player evaluates these alternatives at the outset of the game, that is, period zero. Thus even if we consider the case of waiting for the move of Nature before playing, the evaluation of this possibility takes into account the choice of Gi, (0,O). But in evaluating the equilibrium outcome, player one realizes that from the point of view of period zero, the equilibrium mixing ~1 (in G2) implies a lottery that dominates the equilibrium lottery of the game, G (that is, the mixing p). He thus decides to wait another period in order to force the second player to play the mixed strategy, CY.
In the context of decision theory and nonexpected utility, our results are interesting since, typically, in one-person decision problems, it is advantageous to be able to commit to decisions earlier rather than later. This preference generally arises because of time consistency problems. Suppose that an individual realizes that the actions that maximize his utility today are such that at some future point he would like to change them. Unless the player can commit himself to a sequence of actions, the requirement that his own decisions be time consistent enters into the problem as a constraint, thus reducing the possibility set. A nonexpected utility maximizing player would generally wish to commit to an original plan and not to wait for the realization of the state of Nature. The example above illustrates that this intuition does not carry over to a game context.
Our results, like that of many of the examples of dynamic inconsistency which rely on a type of preference reversal after the realization of a state of Nature, are subject to the critique of Machina (1989) who argues that if we are willing to rule out separability of preferences in static environments then perhaps they should be ruled out in dynamic environments as well. Examples which rely on an agent's change in preferences immediately before and after a realization of a state of Nature may be less compelling since the pure forward-looking character of the analysis implicitly (and perhaps unjustifiably) assumes separability over time. Machina suggests that recently borne risks will have much the same effect on preferences as soon-to-arrive risks. Of course, our example is of most interest exactly in the situation where Machina's analysis has least force, that is, in the case in which an economically significant period of time elapses between the time in which players may first meet and the period after the state of Nature is realized. In such situations, nonseparability across time is likely to be less of an influence and the impact of delay will have greater economic consequences.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The timing of agreements is important in many economic environments -an earlier agreement frequently means that gains from trade may be enjoyed sooner or for a longer period. Nevertheless, we often observe apparently costly delays to agreement. The explanation for such delays typically encounters a paradox. Hicks articulated the puzzle with respect to strikes-if a theory can predict the outcome of a strike which is costly to both parties, how can the theory also explain the failure of the parties to agree to the same outcome before incurring these costs (Kennan, 1986) ? This paper illustrates that even when there are no asymmetries of information, if agents are not expected utility maximizers but behave in accordance with preferences commonly observed in tests of the Allais paradox, they may exhibit a strict preference for delaying agreement. The Allais paradox may help to shed light on the Hicks paradox.
